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Frank L. Nicoli, #79020
I.s.c.I., unit 13
Post Office Box 14
Boise, Idaho
83707

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Frank..

L. Nicolai,
Appellant

VS:

State of Idaho,
Respondent

CASE NUMBER 41566-2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
ADA COUNTY IDAHO CASE NUMBER 2004-1698
REPLY

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

l?or The Appellant
Frank
Nicolai, Pro-Se
I.S.C.I •• Unit 13
Post Office Box 14
Boise. Idaho
83707

Idaho Attorney General
Post Office Box 83720
Boise. Idaho
83720-0101

PROCEDURAL STATEMENT
This is an appeal from the denial of a Motion to Correct an
illegal sentence, which was filed under Idaho Criminal Court Rule
35.
The Appellant has alleged that the sentence as imposed upon
him is not provided for in the laws of the State of Idaho, and
therefore the Court lacked Subject Matter Jurisdiction to impose
that sentence upon him.

(The sentence of "Fixed Life" for a non-

capital crime).
The State has responded and seems to suggest that there is
no difference between a sentence of "Fixed Life, and a sentence
of "life", and states that the Appellant has shown no proof that
he would be eligible for parole after a set amount of years if
his sentence would have been "life".
The Appellant now provides to this Court Exhibit A, which does
in fact show that if sentenced to a term of "life", that he would
be eligible for release upon parole after serving a term of 60
Months.
The Appellant has also shown that because he was sentenced
after the effective date of the Unified Sentencing Act, that the
provisions of that act apply to him.
The Unified sentencing act, codified as §19-2513, makes very
specific findings and holdings. Most importantly, it provides for
"Fixed terms". These are also known as mandatory minimums for which
an inmate cannot be released during that time.
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The State of Idaho has responded and seems to think that the
term, "Consistent" as used in the second paragraph of ~19-2513
gives the sentencing Court the authority to impose a "Fixed term"
that is equal to or greater than the Minimum term as depicted for
in the Statute.
This interpretation does not give meaning and effect to all
the provisio~s of the Unified sentencing act. It would make the
entire second paragraph totally useless.
The second paragraph of the Unified sentencing Act is very
clear as to when it shall be used. It shall be used in those
cases whereas there is a mandatory minimum term contained within
the Statute for which a defendant is being sentenced. And, it also
goes forward to hold that the "Fixed term" shall be consistent to
the minimum term as depicted for in the statute.
To be consistent, a term can not be doubled. That would be
twice as much as otherwise provided for; clearly not consistent.
To be consistent a term would have to be equal to; not
greater than another. To be consistent, a term would need to be
the same as ahother.
Finally, the Appellant h1s shown that he is being punished
more severe).y than a person who is convicted of a Capital crime. A
person who is convicted of a capital crime is granted certain Due
Pro::::ess protections prior to the imposition of a "Fixed Life" term,
while a non-capital defendant is not.
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At the time the sentence was pronounced upon the Petitioner
he was given a term of "FIXED LIFE", which means that he will
never be released from prison.
It is based upon the fact that the sentence of "FIXED LIFE"
is more than what is prescribed by statute for the offense as
charged; and more than the maximum possible punishment as told
to the Petitioner at his arraignment that he is alleging that
his sentence is illegal.
In the case of Apprendi V. New Jersy, 120
L.Ed.2d 435, (2000),

s.ct.

2348, 147

the United States Supreme Court held,

" •.• any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt by being submitted
to a jury".
There is no doubt that the punishment for the crime of
Rape can be a sentence of "LIFE".
There is also no doubt that the sentence of "FIXED LIFE"
is a more severe punishment that the sentence of "LIFE".
Because the sentence of the Petitioner is a sentence of
"FIXED LIFE", and because this sentence is more than what is
provided for by statute,

(The statute naming that the sentence

may be a term of "LIFE"), it is submitted that because the
sentence of "FIXED LIFE" was not presented to a jury and the facts
that increased the sentence from "LIFE" to "FIXED LIFE",

were

not presented to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the
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sentence is illegal as it violates the constitution of the
United States.
The Constitution requires that any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum,
(Other than the fact of a prior conviciton), must be submitted to
a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The Fifth Amendment's
Due Process Clause, and the Sixth Amendment's Notice and jury
trial guarantees require that any fact other than a prior
conviction that increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be
charged in the indictment, submitted to a jry, and proved beyond
a reasonable doubt. Please see, Jones V. United States, 526 U.S.
221, 119 s.ct.1215, 143 L.Ed.2d 311,

(1999).

In the case before this Court, not even the Petitioner knows
why he received a sentence of "FIXED LIFE". The Court did not make
the additional findings of fact that are required to elevate the
sentence from what is statutorily prescribed,
sentence that the Petitioner received,

("LIFE"), to the

("FIXED LIFE").

The Petitioner was never given any type of notice that he
was in jeopardy of receiving a sentence of "FIXED LIFE". At the
time of arraignment

the Petitioner was informed that he could

receive a sentence of "LIFE".

(Which allows for parole eligibility

after a certain amount of time).
The State of Idaho has recognized the difference between
a sentence of "LIFE" and "FIXED LIFE". Please see, State V. Helms,
143 Idaho 79, 137 P.3d 466,
635, 759 P.2d 926,

Reply Brief-4

(1988).

(2006); State V. Eubank, 114 Idaho

In those cases the Idaho state Supreme Court, and or the Idaho
State Court of Appeals found that in order to sentence a criminal
defendant to a term of "FIXED LIFE", the Court must find that a
sentence of fixed life is reasonable because,
" •• the offense is so egregious that it demands an
exceptionally severe measure of retribution and
deterrence, or if the offender is so utterly lacking in
rehabilitation potential that imprisonment until
death is the only feasible means of protecting
society ••••• Unfortunately, in making these determinations
a judge only has complete information in regard to
deterrence and retribution, which are based upon the
nature of the offense. The character of the offender
is not completely known because it may evolve over
time". Please see, State V. Eubank, Supra,
The Petitioner herein declares that when the Court imposed a
sentence of "FIXED LIFE" upon him, it did so in contradiction to
the case law from the upper Courts and also violated the United
States Constitutional provisions as guaranteed to him under the
Sixth Amendment. (The Notice requirement).
A fixed life sentence based primarily upon an evaluation of
character is acceptable only if the sentencing Court can determine
with a high degree of certainty that the perpetrator can never be
safely released into society. Please see, State V. Jackson, 130

Idaho

293, 939 P.2d 1372, (1997).
Because the Court did not make the necessary findings, i.e.,

that the Petitioner could never be rehabilitated and that he
could never be safely released into society; and or, that the
crime the Petitioner stands convicted of is more egregious than
any other kidnap and Rape, for which a "FIXED LIFE" term was not
imposed, then the sentence is illegal and must be corrected.
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"A District Court has no power or authority to impose a
sentence in the absence of specific statutory authority to do
so". State V. Nelson, 966 P.2d 133, (1998); State V. Hatfield,
846 P.2d 1029,
This

(1993); State V. Wilson, 926 P.2d 712, (1996).

means that a Court can only pronounce upon a criminal

Defendant a sentence that is provided for by the Legislature
in a specific Statute. That if ;the sentence that is imposed is
not directly found within legislative enactment, then that
sentence is illegal.
When the Idaho State Legislature enacted the Unified
Sentencing Act,

(Which is codified as §19-2513), it made very

clear and direct reference to those crimes whereas there was or
is a liMandatory Minimum" term provided for within that particular
statute.
§19-2513,

(In the Second Paragraph), states as follows:

"If the statute carries a mandatory minimum penalty
as provided for by Statute, the court shall specify
a minimum period of confinement consistent with such
statute." .••••
As previously stated, the Appellant stands convicted of the
offenses of Rape, and Kidnaping in the seco~d degree. The Offensse
of Rape is punishable by a term of imprisonment of One, (1) year
to life. (There is no mention of the term "fixed Life").
Clearly the one,

(1), year term is a minimum mandatory term

as mentioned in the Rape Statute.
Kidnaping in the Second Degree is punishable by a term of
imprisonment from Five,
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(5), years to life. Again, there is no

mention of a "Fixed Life" sentence.
As this Court knows, if there is no Statutory authority to
impose a particular sentence, then that sentence is not legal.
Because the crimes for which the Appellant is being sentenced
carries within the Statutory scheme for those crimes, a mandatory
minimum period of confinement, it is clear that the Court is
given it's authority to impose the sentence pursuant to the
second paragraph of the unified sentencing act.
The unified Sentencing Act, §19-2513, makes it clear that if
there is a mandatory minimum period of confinement provided for
in the Statute, then the Court SHALL specify a minimum period of
confinement that is consistent with such statute.
When the Court imposed a sentence of "Fixed Life" upon the
Appellant, that is not consistent with the mandatory minimum
period

of confinement as mentioned in the statute for the offense

of Rape.
When the Court imposed a 25 year "fixed" term for the offense
of Second Degree Kidnaping, that is not consistent with the
minimum term as provided for in that statute.
It is not some error that the Legislature did not specifically
mention the term "fixed Life" in the above statutes. It is very
clear that the Legislature does in fact recognize that a term of
"Fixed Life" is more severe than a sentence of life.
In the first degree homicide statute, the legislature made
it very clear that a term of ''Fixed Life" can be imposed, but
to do so there must be certain criteria present. If these are not
Reply Brief-7

or if these aggravating factors are not found, then the sentence
shall be "Life".
It is the Idaho State Legislature itself who has used the
term "Fixed Life" within the context of the First Degree Homicide
Statute. Perhaps more importantly, when the Legislature uses the
term "Fixed Life" it also makes it clear that a Jury must find
the aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. It also makes
clear that a criminal defendant would have notice that his sentence
might be a sentence of "fixed Life".
In short, in order to impose a sentence of "fixed Life" for
a charge of First Degree Homicide, the Court,

(Or a Jury), must

find aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt.
It stands to no reason that for a lesser charge of Rape
that the Court could impose a sentence of "Fixed Life" and never
afford to the Defendant the same protections as those provided to
a criminal defendant who is being sentenced for a charge of
First degree Homicide.
This leads to the inevitable conclusion that a term of
"Fixed Life" is not authorized unless a Jury finds certain
aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, if
the term, "Fixed Life" is not within the specific statutory
maximum term provided for by Statute, then such a term can not
be legally imposed.
The maximum term provided for, by statute, for the crimes
the Appellant stands convicted of is "LIFE". Not "Fixed Life".
The only crime the legislature has authorized a "fixed Life"
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sentence for is the crime of first degree homicide, where the
term "Fixed Life" is clearly provided for by statute.
Because the crimes for which the Appellant has been sentenced
carries within those statutes a mandatory minimum period of
confinement, the Court, pursuant to §19-2513, second paragraph,
must make the fixed term consistent with the mandatory minimum
period of confinement as provided for within the statute in
question.
This leaves the Court to impose an "Indeterminate period"
of up to life, but not a "Fixed Term" in that amount.
Not all crimes in the State of Idaho carries a mandatory
minimum period of confinement within the Statutes, and in those
cases the Court has total discretion to "fix" the entire amount
of the statutory maximum term.
But, because that is not thesituation before this Court, this
Court must follow the Statutory commands of the State of Idaho.
"The failure of a State to follow it's own statutory commands,
may implicate a Due Process violation under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United states Constitution". Hicks V.
Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 65 L.Ed. 2d 175, (1979); Fetterly V.
Paskett,
997 F.2d 1295, (1993); Ballard V. Estelle,
937 F.2d 453, (1991); Lambright V. Stewart, 167 F.3d 477,
(1999).
The statutory commands at issue in this case are the
mandatory terms of §19-2513, second paragraph, whereas it is
mandatory that if there is a minimum period of confinement in
the statute, that the court must make the minimum term of the
sentence to be consistent with that term.
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When the sentencing Court imposed a "Fixed Life" term
for the offense of Rape, that is not a consistent term to the
mandatory minimum term provided for in the Rape statute, and
it is not authorized by the laws of the State of Idaho.
The law does authorize a term of "Life", but does not
allow this term to be fixed. It is to be an indeterminate term.
The "fixed term" is to be consistent with the mandatory minimum
provided for in the Statute. That is a One,

(1), year term. The

Court then is free to impose any amount of indeterminate
sentence, up to, and including a term of life, but it does not
have the authority to "fix" this term, as it is not provided for
by Statute. (The only statute where the term "Fixed Life" is
mentioned is the first degree murder statute).
Because the Court has imposed a sentence of "Fixed Life",
and there is no type of statutory authority to impose such a
term for the offense the Appellant is convicted of, it has
sentenced the Appellant to a term that is not authorized by
law.
Because the crimes for which the Appellant is being
sentenced, carry within those statutes a set mandatory minimum
period of confinement, the Court, when imposing the sentence,
was mandated to follow the commands of §19-2513, the second
paragraph.
Instead, when the Court imposed the sentence upon the
Appellant, the Court used the first paragraph of §19-2513,
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when it imposed the sentence upon the appellant, and under
that paragraph the sentence imposed would have been legal if
the crimes for which the Appellant was being sentenced did not
have a set mandatory minimum period of confinement named in
the statute for which the Appellant was being sentenced.
Finally, because case law from the Idaho State Supreme
Court clearly and conclusively depicts that a sentence of "Life"
and a sentence of "Fixed Life" are not the same,

(A sentence of

Fixed Life being more severe), it is clear that in order to have
imposed a sentence of "Fixed Life" upon the Appellant, he was
entitled to the Due Process Protections of Apprendi V. New Jersey,
Supra, and the beyond a reasonable doubt finding of In Re Winship,
397 U.S. 358, 90

s.ct.

1068, 25 L.Ed. 2d 368,

(1970).

Even for the most serious crime of First Degree Murder, the
Legislature has made it clear that to impose a sentence of
"Fixed Life" there has to be special finds made by the Court,
(If a Jury is waived), or by the Jury if the State seeks to
impose the sentence of "Fixed Life". It is also a default type
of sentence when the death penalty is sought but there are not
enough aggravating factors found to impose the death penalty.
In the above case, it is clearly named in the first degree
murder statute, §18-4004, that a sentence of "Fixed Life" can
be imposed after certain actions are done.
Nowhere in the Statutory scheme of Rape or of second degree
kidnaping is there a mention of a "fixed life" term, and therefore
it is not authorized, and is an illegal sentence.
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CONCLUSION

Because a "FIXED LIFE" term is not authorized by statute,
(Only a "LIFE" sentence is so authorized), and because the Idaho
Courts have made a clear determination that a sentence of "FIXED
LIFE" is more severe than a sentence of "LIFE", it is clear that
the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi V.
New Jersy;1 1 Supra,

has been violated because the jury did not

make the required findings, beyond a reasonable doubt, to allow
the Court to impose the more severe penalty, therefore making it
an unauthorized sentence.
The Court did not state why the Petitioner was receiving a
sentence of "FIXED LIFE" for the crime charged. The Court did not
make any type of finding which shows that the Petitioner cannot
be rehabilitated, or that he can never be release safely into
society.
It is for these reasons, and because the sentence imposed is
beyond that which is statutorily depicted for, that this Court
should enter an order which allows for a new sentencing hearing,
at which the Petitioner should be appointed Counsel to assist him.
OATH OF PETITIONER

Comes now, Frank

Nicolai, the Petitioner herein, who

avers and states as follows:
I have read the enclosed Brief. I know the contents therein
h A l i A ~ ' b e true and correct to the best of my belief.
-

~ !

Frank

Nicolai, Pro-Se
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1frcJJ1/
Dated

IDAPA 50.01.01 • Rules of the
Commission of Pardons and .Parole

IDAHO ADMINISTRA11VE CODE
Commission for Pardons and Parole

TABLE1
Minimum nme To Se Served
Before Initial Hearing

Length Of Sentence
Three (3) years or less
More than three (3) years to less than five (5) years
Five (5) years to less than seven (7) years
Seven (7) years

to less than ten (10) years

-

-

Nine (9) months
Twelve (12) months
Rfteen (15) months
Twenty (20) months

Sixteen (16) years to less than twenty-six (26) years

-

Twenty-four (24) months

to life sentence

-

Forty-eight (48) months

Life sentence

-

Sixty (60) months

Ten (10) years to less than sixteen (16) years

Twenty-six (26) years up

Thirty-six (36) months

(3-23-98)

In cases of offenses committed on or after February I, 1987, and a minimum fixed term has been
ii.
specified, the initial hearing may be scheduled prior to the parole eligibility date, during the month of parole
.
(3-30-01)
eligibility, or as noted in Subsection 250.02.b.vi.
iii.

Consecutive Sentences. All fixed terms will be served before the indet.erminate tenns commence.
(3-23-98)

When more than one (I) sentence is being served concutrently, the initial hearing will not be
iv.
(3-23-98)
scheduled until all fixed tenns have been served.
v.
If an inmate escapes prior to the primacy :review or the initial hearing, the review or hearing will be
conducted within a reasonable time of notification of the inmate's return. taking into consideration any additional
commitments.
(3-23-98)
vi.
If an inmate is committed to the department of correction and such inmate is eligible for parole
immediately or within a short period of time, the initial parole hearing will be scheduled six (6) months from the
month the commission was notified of the commitment.
(4-5-00)
c.
The commission is not :responsible for the accuracy of the sentence calculation as determined by
the department of correction, records office. The commission utilizes the documents as being accurate.
(3-30-01)

03.
General Conditions of Parole. The commission establishes rules and conditions for every inmate
released to parole, and those conditions are.
(3-23-98)

a.
Parolee will go directly to the destination approved by the commission and, upon arrival, report as
instructed to the parole officer or peison whose name and address appear on the arrival notice; any deviation in travel
(3-23-98)
plans will require prior permission from the commission staff.

b.

The parolee shall.

(3-23-98)

i
Woi:k diligently in a lawful occupation or a program approved by the commission or supervising
officer and not change employment or designated program without written pennission from the commission or
supervising officer.
(3-23-98)
ii.

Support dependents to the best of his ability.

(3-23-98)
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